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The Necessity of God’s Existence 1
Daniel von Wachter
The traditional thesis that God exists necessarily
I could as well not exist. Had I fallen from the cliff last year, I would not
exist now. Furthermore, had my parents not met, or had God not created a
universe, I would never have come into existence. At any rate, there are
many ways the world could be without me, or even without anybody like
me. It is, in this sense, possible that I do not exist. The same is true for the
sparrow who wake me up this morning, the bread I had for breakfast, the
sun, and the moon. All these things, like you and me, exist contingently.
God has traditionally been taken to be different in this respect. Whilst a
world without me is a perfectly possible alternative to the actual world, a
world without God is not a possible alternative to the actual world. God ex-
ists necessarily. Avicenna, Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, and
John Duns Scotus, as well as many later authors, e.g. Leibniz, held this view
in one or another form.2 Anselm, for example, expressed this view by saying
that God “cannot even be thought not to exist” and that God, of all things,
“most truly” exists and, of all things, possesses existence “to the highest de-
gree” (Proslogion, §3, p. 88). In his Reply to Gaunilo (§1, p. 112), explain-
ing what he means by this, he says that “if this being [God] were to exist, it
would not be capable of not-existing”. God, if he exists at all, exists neces-
sarily (“ex necessitate”).3 Anselm explains at some length under which cir-
cumstances a thing “cannot be thought as not existing” (see Reply to
Gaunilo, §1, p. 112f, and §4, p. 115). He points out that something which
has parts “can possibly not exist” (§1, 113) because it can be broken up. His
conclusion seems to be that something exists necessarily if, and only if, it
exists at all times and if it does not consist of parts and is therefore imper-
ishable.4
My task in this article is to explore what the claim that God exists neces-
sarily should be taken to mean and whether, if God exists at all, it is true. I
shall argue that it is true if it is interpreted with the right concept of neces-
sity. I should point out that I am not concerned here with arguments for the
existence of God. In particular, I am not concerned with ontological argu-
ments for the existence of God. “God exists necessarily” is not supposed to
mean that God’s existence is certain. Nor will I discuss here whether the ne-
cessity of God’s existence can play a role in an argument for the existence
of God. Our question here is: if there is a God, does he exist in some sense
necessarily? In other words, is theism best spelled out such that it entails the
claim that God exists in some sense necessarily?
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Logical positivism about necessity
When contemporary philosophers speak about necessity they usually mean
“logical necessity”. It is worth remembering that this is a heritage of logical
positivism. Let me give a rough summary of this story. At the heart of logi-
cal positivism there is a particular doctrine about necessity and about what
was in those days called “the apriori”. Earlier philosophers as well as phe-
nomenologists, for example Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, believed
that there are true claims – such as “Nothing can be green and red all over”
or “Every tone has a pitch” – about what can and what cannot be, which tell
us something “about the world” and its metaphysical structure. These claims
were called apriori statements, or necessary statements (or “truths”). Logical
positivists, like Moritz Schlick (see his 1930) or A. J. Ayer (see his 1936),
took it that the truth of such statements would have to be known “independ-
ent of all experience”, and they believed that we can have knowledge of the
world only through sense experience. They concluded that knowledge of
necessary truths about the world would be an epistemological miracle. As
they didn’t want to give up the idea that all knowledge about the world
comes through sense experience and assumed that apriori truths are known
independently of experience, they adopted the view that there are no apriori
truths about the world. However, there are statements which they were
willing to call apriori and necessary, namely analytic statements, i.e. state-
ments like “Bachelors are unmarried”. So they proclaimed that all analytic
statements are necessary, and that all necessary statements are analytic.
“Necessity” used in this way is what came to be called “logical necessity”.
Today, seventy years later, this view about necessity is still the received
view. Most contemporary philosophers mean by “necessity” logical neces-
sity, and they take philosophical questions about whether x is possible – e.g.
whether backward causation is possible – to be questions about whether x is
logically possible. Sometimes a slightly wider concept is used, which is then
called “broadly logical necessity” (cf. Plantinga 1974, 2), and, following
Kripke and Putnam, many say that also statements like “Water is H2O” are
necessary. But the paradigm of a necessary statement is still “Bachelors are
unmarried”.
The modern interpretation of “God exists necessarily”
It was natural for philosophers of religion in the last decades then to inter-
pret the traditional claim that God exists necessarily as the claim that the
statement “God exists” is analytic. However, as it was soon widely recog-
nised, interpreted like this the traditional claim is quite implausible. Para-
digm cases of analytic statements are statements like “Bachelors are unmar-
ried”, and “God exists” does not resemble these paradigm cases in the rele-
vant respect. A bachelor is defined as an unmarried man, in the sense that
the word “bachelor”, in English, is used to say of something that it is an
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unmarried man. Hence “Bachelors are unmarried” is an analytic statement
according to Ayer’s definition of an analytic statement as one whose truth
“depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains” (Ayer 1936,
73). Kant brought out the same point by saying that the concept of being
unmarried is “contained” in the concept of a bachelor and that in analytic
statements the predicate concept is already contained in the subject concept.
If “God exists” were analytic, the word “God” would be used to say of
something, amongst other things, that it exists. To say “God does not exist”
would be, like “John is a married bachelor”, contradictory. However, to say
that God does not exist may be false, but it is not contradictory. Further-
more, if “God exists” were analytic we could not use the term “God” for
expressing the belief that there is no God. The reason for this is that in order
to claim of something that it is F we need to refer to the thing with a de-
scription which does neither entail that the thing is F nor that it is not F.
That is why we cannot make a claim about who in this room is married by
saying “The bachelors in this room are unmarried”. But one can express the
belief that there is no God by saying “God does not exist”. Hence “God ex-
ists” is not analytic.5
A theist who accepts the theory of necessity propagated by logical posi-
tivism will have to give up the traditional view that God exists necessarily.
At least he has to hold that God’s existence is not necessary in the strongest
sense, though he might want to say that it is necessary in some weaker
sense. (E.g. Schrader 1991) However, I shall argue now that God – if he
exists – exists necessarily in the strongest sense. God’s existence is neces-
sary in the sense of synthetic necessity6. Synthetic necessity obtains where a
statement of the form “Necessarily p” (or “It cannot be that so-and-so”) is
true and neither it, nor p, is analytic. For example, “Nothing can be green
and red all over” is presumably a case of synthetic necessity if the concept
of being not red is not contained in the concept of being green. “Necessarily,
bachelors are unmarried”, on the other hand, is not a case of synthetic ne-
cessity because it is analytic that bachelors are unmarried.7 “God exists nec-
essarily” is a case of synthetic necessity if, given that God exists and that
“God exists” is not analytic, it is true to say that God exists necessarily. In
order to examine this we need to spell out some aspects of theism. In par-
ticular, we will have to consider what the reasons are for assuming that God
exists everlastingly.
Theism
According to theism there is a person who is omnipotent, omniscient, and
perfectly good.8 He has no cause, in the sense that nothing brought him into
being or sustains him in being. He is cause of everything – at least every-
thing temporal – in the sense that nothing comes into being and continues to
exist unless God wills or, at least, allows it to do so. If there once was noth-
ing besides God and then something came into being, then it was God who
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brought this about. If, for example, the universe had a beginning and before
there was only God, then it was God who brought the universe about and
who has sustained it since then. It is possible that, at some time, there is a
God and no universe, because God could abolish the universe or, given that
he has no obligation to create a universe, he could have refrained from
bringing it into existence. But it is impossible that at some time there is a
universe but no God, because nothing can exist unless God sustains it. Eve-
rything is in this sense causally dependent upon God.
Theists usually believe that God is everlasting, that is, that he has always
existed and will exist for ever.9 He has neither beginning nor end. One could
simply stipulate that this is part of theism. One could stipulate, for example,
that it is implied by “God exists” that God will exist for ever. However, that
would not rule out that the one who created the universe, who is omnipotent,
omniscient, and perfectly good, will cease to exist. It would just have the
consequence that if he were to drop out of existence he would not fall under
the concept of God anymore. Making it part of the concept of God that God
exists for ever would make it in some sense true to say that “God (if he ex-
ists at all) exists for ever”, but not in an interesting one. The interesting
question is not whether the creator of our universe if he were to drop out of
existence would still fall under the concept of God; the interesting question
is whether it could happen that the creator of our universe, who is omnipo-
tent etc., drops out of existence. So let us ask whether there is a reason for
assuming that God is everlasting.
Has God always existed?
First, consider the question whether God has always existed. If there was a
time when God did not exist, then what happened at that time was not in his
control. Whatever happened then, God was not able to prevent it from hap-
pening. This is quite clearly at odds with the idea of God being omnipotent.
Further, if there was once no God, how should God have come into exis-
tence? Perhaps there can be uncaused events, but it is difficult to see how
the coming into existence of a God could be an uncaused event. If, on the
other hand, God’s coming into being was caused, then God would be de-
pendent on this cause, and this is incompatible with his omnipotence. I con-
clude that, if there is a God, he has always existed.
Now consider the question whether it is possible that God will cease to
exist. This question is to be divided into three questions. (A) Is it possible
that God is destroyed? (B) Is it possible that God ceases to exist by accident,
i.e. without cause? (C) Is it possible that God commits suicide? If these
three questions are to be negated, then it is impossible that God will cease to
exist.
On (A). God is powerful enough to prevent anything from abolishing
him. Nothing is powerful enough to abolish God against his will. If God was
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abolished in accordance with his will, that would amount to divine suicide,
which we will discuss under (C).
On (B). God would only cease to exist by accident if he were to allow
this to happen. This would, again, amount to divine suicide, which we will
discuss under (C).
On (C). Is it possible that God will commit suicide, i.e. bring his exis-
tence to an end? An omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person is a very
great good indeed, whose death would be a great loss. God’s death would
also be the end of all created goods. Further, after God’s death there would
be no divine benefactions anymore and no relationships between God and
other persons. If God were to cease to exist, these goods would be lost, and
no good would be gained. We may assume that all this constitutes an over-
riding reason for God for not committing suicide. Given that it is impossible
that God, being perfectly rational and omniscient, would do something
which he has overriding reasons for not doing, we may assume that it is im-
possible that God would commit suicide.10 Given our discussion of (A), (B),
and (C), we may conclude that it is impossible that God will cease to exist.
We have another argument for the thesis that God has no beginning and
no end if we accept the claim that there cannot be a time at which there are
no (real) things. This claim is plausible even if we assume, following Shoe-
maker (1969), that there can be time without change. If there is nothing,
then there is also no time. Assume further that if God does not exist at a
certain time, then at that time nothing exists. Nothing can exist unless God
sustains it in being, and if at a time there is no God then he does not sustain
anything in being at that time, hence at that time there is nothing. It follows
from the premise that there cannot be a time at which there are no things
that there is no such time. Hence – if he exists at all – God exists at all
times. He has no beginning and no end.
Necessary existence
Now let us consider under which circumstances it is true to say of some-
thing that it exists necessarily. We can approach this question by asking first
under which circumstances something does not exist necessarily. Surely
something which did not exist at some time in the past does not exist neces-
sarily. So a thing which has a beginning does not exist necessarily. Further,
something which in the future might cease to exist does not exist necessar-
ily. However, it doesn’t follow from the fact that it is impossible that a cer-
tain thing will cease to exist that it exists necessarily. The reason for this is
that something which did not exist at some time or which could have ceased
to exist at some time does not exist necessarily, even if it is impossible that
it will cease to exist. But if for something there is a time before which it has
always existed (that is, if it has no beginning) and if it cannot cease to exist
(i.e. if it is imperishable), then it exists necessarily. Something exists only
not necessarily if there is a time at which it did not exist or if at some time it
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is possible that it would cease to exist. I suggest that this is the most natural
and the correct way of understanding a claim that a thing exists necessarily.
If the following four claims, which I have defended above, are true then
God exists necessarily.
1. There is a time in the past before which God has always existed.
2. It is impossible that God is abolished.
3. It is impossible that God ceases to exist by accident, i.e. without
cause.
4. It is impossible that God commits suicide.
It follows from (2), (3), and (4) that God is imperishable, that is, that it is
impossible that he ceases to exist. This leaves the possibility that God once
did not exist, which is excluded by (1). (1) states that God has no beginning,
and then (2), (3), and (4) take over.
That God exists necessarily can also be derived from the following two
claims.
A. There cannot be a time at which nothing exists.
B. If there is no God at time t then nothing exists at t.
(B) is derived from the claim that nothing can exist unless God sustains it. It
follows from (A) and (B), as explained above, that it is impossible that God
has a beginning or an end. That means that he has always existed and that he
cannot cease to exist. Hence, if God exists at all, he exists necessarily.
What is necessity in the strongest sense?
It might be objected that necessity in this sense is not necessity in the
strongest sense, because it is not “logical necessity”.11 But I think it is not so
clear that logical necessity is stronger than synthetic necessity. In fact, I
have argued elsewhere (1999) that statements which are “logically neces-
sary” are true solely in virtue of linguistic conventions and therefore don’t
deserve to be called “necessary” at all. There would be a quick way of de-
ciding which kind of necessity is stronger if something’s being necessary in
the one sense entailed its being necessary in the other sense but not vice
versa. But as no statement can be both logically and synthetically necessary,
we can’t decide the matter this way.
The defender of logical necessity takes statements like “Bachelors are
unmarried” as paradigms for necessity in the strongest sense. He will argue
that God’s existence falls short of that kind of necessity and is therefore not
necessary in the strongest sense. Isn’t God’s existing with “synthetic neces-
sity” compatible with it being, as Alstong puts it, “a gigantic cosmic acci-
dent” (Alston 1997, 43)? Isn’t it compatible with God not existing in all
possible worlds? I reply that God’s existence being synthetically necessary
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does rule out that it is a gigantic cosmic accident because the existence of a
thing is only an accident if at some time it was possible that the thing would
cease to exist (or if it was possible that the thing would not come into exis-
tence). I have argued that this is ruled out. What about the objection that
existing with synthetic necessity falls short of existing in all possible
worlds? Depends on what you mean by “possible worlds”. If you mean by
possible worlds “logically possible worlds”, then you will say that God does
not exist in all possible worlds. But this does not show that God’s existence
is not necessary in the strongest sense.
Why should we think that the necessity for which “Bachelors are unmar-
ried” is a paradigm is stronger, or deeper, or more fundamental than syn-
thetic necessity? Doesn’t common sense suggest that the fact that bachelors
are unmarried is merely a matter of language, or of linguistic convention?
And if “God exists” were analytic, wouldn’t that merely reflect how we use
the term “God”? I believe that logical positivism by teaching us to interpret
philosophical questions about what can and what cannot be in terms of logi-
cal possibility and logical necessity put us on the wrong track. Of course, I
cannot defend this general thesis here. But I have argued that it is a mistake
to interpret the traditional claim that God exists necessarily in terms of logi-
cal necessity, and that once it is interpreted in terms of synthetic necessity it
turns out to be true.
Notes
1 This is an abridged version of my article “Die Notwendigkeit der Exis-
tenz Gottes”, Metaphysica 2 (2001), 55-81. I thank the editors of Meta-
physica and the Verlag Röll for the permission to reuse the material. I am
grateful to the German Academic Exchange Service, DAAD, who made
this work possible through a grant from the Gemeinsames Hochschul-
sonderprogramm III von Bund und Ländern.
2 See Avicenna, al-Risalat al-‘arshiya (see Arberry 1951, 32); Anselm of
Canterbury, Proslogion, §3, and Reply to Gaunilo, §1 and §4; Aquinas,
Summa theologiae Ia, 2,3 (“Third Way”); Duns Scotus, Tractatus de
primo principio, 34ff and 91; Leibniz, On the Ultimate Origination of
Things.
3 Anselm’s claim that God cannot be thought not to exist (or that “he pos-
sesses existence to the highest degree”, or that “he exists necessarily”) is
to be distinguished from his famous claim that saying that God is
“something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought” implies that
God exists because something which exists is thereby greater than
something which does not exist. In the Proslogion each of these two
claims serves as starting point for an argument for the existence of God.
These two arguments can be taken to be two versions of the “ontological
argument”. In the first argument (Proslogion, §2) Anselm claims that
God’s existence follows from the fact that God is that-than-which-
nothing-greater-can-be-thought because something which exists is
523
thereby greater than something which does not exist. In the second argu-
ment (Proslogion, §3) Anselm claims that God’s existence follows from
the fact that God is that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought be-
cause something which exists necessarily (i.e. which “cannot be thought
not to exist”) is thereby greater than something which possesses exis-
tence to a lesser degree; and that God exists necessarily entails that God
exists.
4 “All those things (and they alone) that have a beginning or end or are
made up of parts and [...] all those things that do not exist as a whole in a
particular place or at a particular time can be thought as not existing.”
(Reply to Gaunilo, §3, p. 115)
5 For more arguments for the claim that “God exists” is not analytic see my
(2001), and also Plantinga (1964, 216-219) and Swinburne (1993, 272-
275). For a defense of the claim that God’s existence is “logically neces-
sary” see Adams (1971) and (1983). (See also Adams 1988, 27-31) How-
ever, in his (1983) he states that logically necessary truths need not be
analytic. So he does not seem to contradict those who claim that “God
exists” is not analytic. Adams uses a very wide concept of “logical neces-
sity”, which seems to include what I call logical necessity, which is
equivalent to analyticity, as well as what I shall call synthetic necessity.
He does not specify more precisely in which sense God exists necessar-
ily.
6 I have developed and defended the concept of synthetic necessity in my
(2000).
7 J. N. Findlay, in his famous article “Can God’s Existence be Disproved?”
(1948), argued as follows. God does not exist necessarily because “God
exists” is not analytic. But if there were to be a God he would not
“merely happen to exist” but he would exist necessarily, hence there is no
God. G. E. Hughes (1955) replied that “God exists” is not analytic, but
that God’s existence is perhaps “synthetically necessary”. This is the
view which I am developing in this article. Terence Penelhum (1960),
being sceptical about synthetic necessity, argued that “God exists neces-
sarily” is true if “necessary” is interpreted as “indispensable”. “A thing is
necessary if it is indispensable.” He called necessity in this sense “factual
necessity” (Penelhum 1960, 185). John Hick (1961) endorsed this view.
Kenny 1966 contains a helpful survey over the debate following
Findlay’s article.
8 For a detailed formulation of theism see Swinburne (1993) and Morris
(1991).
9 I am assuming that God is not “outside” of time. For a defense of this
view see Wolterstorff (1975) and Swinburne (1993).    
10 This argument is to be found in St. Anselm’s Monologion: “That which
wills the demise of the supreme good [God] is no unalloyed good. [...]
Therefore the supreme good does not come to an end of its own accord.”
(§ 18)
11 D.E. Schrader, for example, thinks that if God’s existence were logically
necessary it would be necessary in the strongest sense, and that if it were
necessary in another sense it would be necessary in a weaker sense. He
says we need to look for “a notion of divine necessity a bit more modest
than logical necessity”. (Schrader 1991, 46)
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